Assyrian/Chaldean/syriac📡 syriacpressBy SyriacPressSep 16, 2026👁 1 views

Have We Lost, or Are We Crossing a Historic Threshold?

Have We Lost, or Are We Crossing a Historic Threshold?

16/09/2026

Recently, various readings and assessments have emerged regarding the political developments taking place in Syria. In particular, some circles seek to portray the ongoing process, starting from the future of the Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and in definitive terms, as a “defeat,” “surrender,” or an “imperialist project,” or as evidence of the complete collapse of everything that had been put forward over the years. These assessments need to be read carefully, because what is being presented to us today is not merely a political development taking place in Syria, it is also a debate over how to interpret the entire political experience that the Kurds and other peoples have lived through over the past 15 years.

Some interpret this entire process with phrases such as, “It was not a revolution,” “It was a structure organized by imperialists,” and “America used it and is now abandoning it.” This, specifically, is the fundamental perspective of the text from which we begin. But in our view, the fundamental question should be different. Are the Kurds and Syriacs genuinely weaker today than they were yesterday, or are they standing on the threshold of a new phase in which, for the first time, some of the political, cultural, and societal gains that they were denied for centuries have begun to emerge into the open? I believe we are compelled to answer this question based on realpolitik, not emotions.

One of the greatest problems facing the peoples of the Middle East is that they often begin by thinking through political concepts defined by others before thinking about their own genuine needs. Concepts such as imperialism, socialism, anti-imperialism, revolution, nationalism, liberalism, and conservatism undoubtedly carry historical and political meanings. But no concept can replace the security, freedom, and political future of a people.

The Syriacs and Kurds are among the peoples who have repeatedly paid the price for this throughout history. At times, we became part of the ideological calculations of others. At other times, our internal divisions prevented us from taking advantage of the opportunities available to us. At certain stages, we also failed to adequately assess the real balance of power in politics. As a result, there were periods when we placed the interests of other states and powers above our own interests. Consequently, while others were establishing their states or strengthening their influence, we were often trying to preserve our existence within the states of others. Therefore, what we should do today is not reproduce the mistakes of the past within another ideological framework.

Some circles today, looking back at the past, seek to lecture the Kurds and Syriacs as follows: “You should not have established relations with America,” “You should not have cooperated with the Syrian Democratic Forces,” “The Rojava experience was a mistake,” and “You should have acted differently.” But what was the alternative? At the harshest stages of the Syrian war, when the Islamic State (ISIS) was advancing against the peoples of the region, the Assad regime was still in power, Turkey maintained military strength along the border, Iran and Russia were acting according to their own interests, and all the countries of the region were pursuing their own calculations, what independent and safe option was available to the Kurds and Syriacs?

Were they offered an independent state? Was there another international guarantee that would have enabled them to ensure their own security? Was there another political solution on the table that was accepted by all the influential parties in the region? No. This is precisely where realpolitik begins. Under the circumstances of that time, people had to survive, confront ISIS, protect their cities and villages, preserve the cohesion of their communities, and create political space for themselves. It is easy today to tell those who did this, “Why didn’t you act differently?” But history was not written behind desks, it was written amid war, death, and uncertainty.

Yes, the United States supported the SDF. The International Coalition also provided support to the SDF, while France provided political and diplomatic support. None of this should be denied. The United States also acted according to its interests, as did France, Turkey, Russia, Iran, Israel, and the Arab states. So, is the mistake simply that the Kurds and Syriacs sought to protect their own interests? The fundamental issue is not whether one should establish a relationship with a particular state, but to what extent one can use that relationship independently and in a way that serves one’s political objectives.

Reducing the historical significance of the Rojava or North and East Syria experience to the question of which areas were under whose control and on what date is not accurate. A more important transformation has taken place. Kurdish identity has become a reality that cannot be ignored in Syrian politics. The existence of the Kurdish people has also become such a strong political reality that it can no longer be treated merely as a “security problem.” Issues concerning the Kurdish language, culture, political representation, and local administration have become part of discussions about Syria’s future. None of these can be considered minor gains. Of course, it is still too early to say that all these gains have become permanently established. But neither can we ignore the fact that a people whose existence was once denied is now in a political position that enables it to negotiate openly over its rights and say that “no gains have been achieved.”

As for us Syriacs, the issue is not only about what the Kurds are doing. It has become necessary to clarify our own political reality more clearly. Syriacs are not guests in the Middle East. They are one of the indigenous and ancient peoples of this region. Our language, culture, churches, monasteries, villages, cities, and history are all integral parts of this geography. Therefore, defending the political rights of the Kurds does not mean that Syriacs are abandoning their own rights. Likewise, defending the Syriac cause does not mean standing against Kurdish rights.

The freedom of the Kurds and the freedom of the Syriacs are not contradictory choices or alternatives to one another. But here we must distinguish between two important matters. We Syriacs are not enemies of the Kurds, nor are we a subordinate branch of the Kurdish political movement. We want to be equal political partners, with our own identity, language, history, and political will.

Ending an independent military force may reduce the Kurds’ negotiating leverage in some areas. This should be assessed realistically. But it is also incorrect to automatically conclude that “the Kurds have lost.” Politics is not limited to armed power. In fact, the struggle is now moving into the political sphere: constitutional rights, local administration, language and education, cultural rights, political representation, security, property rights, the safe return of displaced people to their homes, as well as ensuring all these rights legally and constitutionally.

If these rights can be guaranteed, the end of a military structure does not mean the end of the political struggle. On the contrary, it may mark the beginning of a new political phase.

The most important task facing the Kurds in the coming phase is to strengthen the political struggle as an alternative to armed struggle. No Kurdish political entity should become a tool or proxy for any other state. Today, the Kurds must derive their strength not only from their military capabilities, but also from their political acumen, diplomatic capabilities, organization, and the democratic will of their communities.

The interests of no major power completely coincide with our own. Therefore, we should not place unconditional trust in the United States or any other power. At the same time, however, we should not politically restrict ourselves to the point of preventing us from speaking with any influential party.

For us Syriacs, it is no longer enough to ask, “Who will protect us?” The fundamental question is, “How will we guarantee our future ourselves?” Therefore, Syriacs should have their own political program. This program should clearly and concretely include constitutional recognition, Syriac language and cultural rights, the right to education, protection of churches and monasteries, protection of towns and historical sites, political representation, effective participation in local administrations, property rights, the safe and voluntary return of displaced Syriacs to their homes, as well as economic and social development.

The future of the Syriacs should not be left solely to decisions made in Damascus. We must build our own political will. Therefore, we must now move beyond the question, “Whose side are you on?” For years, we have been asked the same question in the Middle East: “Are you on the side of America or Russia? Or are you on the side of Turkey, Damascus, or the Kurds?” But none of these questions is our fundamental question. Our fundamental question is, “How do we protect the interests of our people?”

If a state supports us today, we can benefit from that support in a way that serves the interests of our people, but we will not surrender ourselves to that state. If another people is moving with us today as a partner, we will move with them, but we will not abandon our own political will. I believe this is one of the most important transformations today for Syriacs and Kurds. For centuries, we often waited for the decisions of others. Today, however, we have a serious reservoir of political experience, an international presence, organizational capacity, and accumulated experience that enables us to build relations with regional actors. We should not underestimate the importance of this. At the same time, however, we should not be carried away by romantic dreams.

The issue concerns the kind of Syrian state we want. Will it be a centralized and authoritarian state based on a single identity and sect? Or a state based on citizenship, pluralism, the rule of law, and equality among all peoples? The model we should defend is clear: equal citizenship, pluralism, the rule of law, and constitutional guarantees for the rights of peoples.

Syriacs today have a political and international presence that enables them to defend their identity, language, and culture more strongly. The peoples of the region are no longer merely speaking about their rights in secret. Many issues that once seemed impossible have today become part of political negotiations. This in itself is a gain. Nothing has been guaranteed yet, but neither has everything been lost. The fundamental issue is whether we can protect the gains we have and build the political mindset and organized will capable of turning them into firmly established and lasting rights.

At the conclusion of all these discussions, we should say something specifically to our Syriac people. While discussing the political calculations of other peoples, let us not forget our own cause.

Let us respond from our own history to those who tell us, “You have lost,” and to those who continue to offer us advice, saying, “You should have done this, and you should not have done that.” We Syriacs have lived for centuries under extremely harsh conditions. We were uprooted from our lands, our villages were emptied of their inhabitants, and our language and identity were suppressed in many places. Millions of our people were forced to scatter across different countries around the world. Yet despite all this, we are still here today. Our language and culture are still alive. Our churches and monasteries still stand. Our history remains with us. Most importantly, the Syriac identity is still alive, and we should not underestimate this. A people’s ability to preserve its identity despite centuries of all forms of oppression is, in itself, a form of historical resistance. But we can no longer be satisfied with merely surviving.

The new goal of the Syriac people is not limited to survival, it is to become an active people and a political subject. To achieve this, we must develop our political awareness and strengthen our institutions. We must educate our youth about our history and identity and strengthen the ties between our homeland and our diaspora. We should also develop our political representation through democratic and legitimate means in every country where Syriacs live, and demand that when Syria’s future is discussed, the Syriacs be present at the negotiating table, that their vision be heard, and that their rights be constitutionally guaranteed.

What we want is to live as equals, with our own identity and independent will. Therefore, it is not correct to reduce the psychological state of the Syriac people today to the binary of “we won” or “we lost.” Our response to those who tell us, “You have lost,” is this. We are still here. We still have our identity, language, history. and will to build our future. What we must do now is not retreat while mourning the past, but learn from it and move forward toward the future with greater strength. The Syriac cause is a historic cause that must be revisited with a new political awareness, and the future of this cause depends on the extent to which we believe in our people and in our future.

Let us believe in ourselves, hold firmly to our identity, trust one another, organize ourselves, and strengthen our political awareness. Let us leave our future out of the hands of others. We are not merely a people with a pas,; we are a people that should have a future.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.