Iran: America’s Options

07/09/2026

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

The US-Iran confrontation has entered a phase that appears likely to drag on: a controlled standoff without either a full-scale war or a settlement. The picture today is as follows: the US Navy is blockading Iranian ports and preventing oil exports, while allowing a minimum flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Verbal escalation between Washington and Tehran continues, with threats periodically turning into limited military clashes.

This status quo is likely to persist. Despite its costs, it is giving the United States a points advantage. The situation arose after the bet on a swift knockout blow against the Iranian regime—the aim of the Trump administration during the first weeks of the war—failed to pay off.

In theory, Washington now has two options for changing the situation: retreat and lift the blockade without securing any gains, or escalate the military confrontation to a dramatic new level. In practice, neither appears likely.

A retreat would be difficult. The Trump administration cannot afford to concede to the Iranian regime’s demands, because any humiliation for the United States abroad would carry a political cost at home. The images of the chaotic American withdrawal from Kabul airport continue to haunt former President Joe Biden’s administration to this day. Republicans have used them as a political weapon against Democrats, despite the fact that negotiations over the withdrawal with the Taliban began under Trump himself.

It would be difficult for Trump to allow Democrats to use the same weapon against him, i.e. portraying him as a president who lost a war and humiliated the United States. This is particularly true because, in the eyes of Americans, a defeat at the hands of Iran, if it were to happen, would be far more serious than handing Afghanistan over to the Taliban.

But a major escalation is not an attractive option either. The air campaigns have failed to break the Iranian regime. They are costly, and there is no evidence that expanding them would produce a different outcome. As for a ground invasion, it is politically almost impossible, even if militarily feasible. Neither Trump nor the electoral base that brought him to the White House on a promise to stay out of foreign wars, particularly in the Middle East, wants another large-scale ground war.

The American dilemma, therefore, is clear: retreat is unacceptable, while rapid progress is impossible. The status quo therefore remains.

That is not necessarily a bad outcome for Washington. Ultimately, the cost of maintaining the stalemate is greater for Iran than for the U.S. Nor should Tehran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz to put pressure on the US or global economy be overstated. This is no longer 1973. The U.S. is now a major oil producer and exporter, and its economy is better able to absorb higher oil prices. Moreover, artificial intelligence has injected new and sustained vitality into the US economy, while American economic indicators remain broadly positive despite higher oil prices.

By contrast, Iran entered the war already suffering from a deep economic and social crisis. Its situation is now far worse.

Therefore, in the current war of attrition, Iran appears to be the side more vulnerable to losing. The United States does not need a quick win; it only needs to maintain its blockade for the foreseeable future. In confronting Iran, the best American strategy today may be to avoid doing anything dramatic.

One factor, however, makes all these assessments uncertain: Donald Trump himself. The president who may prefer to maintain the current stalemate today could change his mind tomorrow. His unpredictable personality keeps all scenarios open.

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watan on 7 September 2026. The original can be found here.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.