Israeli Elections and Lebanon

14/09/2026

By Dr. Amine Iskandar | President of the Syriac Maronite Union – Tur Levnon

In Israel, the perception of an existential threat transcends all political divides. The war will therefore continue, but at different paces. Eisenkot, more inclined towards negotiations, risks prolonging Lebanon’s agony, thus slowing the pacification process in the Levant and the resolution of the Iranian issue. Conversely, the potential participation of the right wing of Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and Winter in Netanyahu’s bloc would make the latter’s policy more radical and more determined in his war aimed at eradicating Hezbollah.

Israeli elections are scheduled for 27 October 2026. Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot are now competing for the position of Prime Minister. The stakes no longer seem solely linked to the number of seats won by their respective parties. They will depend much more on the coalitions each manages to form to obtain the decisive majority of 61 seats out of the 120 in the Knesset.

Benjamin Netanyahu is the leader of Likud, the main Israeli right-wing party, founded in 1973. A national-conservative party, it is firmly established and enjoys exceptional renown, based on its long experience in power. Indeed, with the exception of an 18-month interruption from 2021 to 2022, Netanyahu served as Prime Minister from 2009 to 2026, a period of 16 years, thus surpassing David Ben-Gurion in terms of longevity in office.

The current election appears as a kind of referendum on Netanyahu as the “guarantor of the security” of the Jewish state. The dramatic events of 7 October 2023, have indeed profoundly shaken the country. Added to this are the wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, which will significantly influence voters’ choices, alongside economic and institutional considerations.

Facing him, one figure is increasingly emerging as a potential challenger for the prime ministership. Gadi Eisenkot, with his Yashar party, is even predicted to win according to some polls. Forecasts predict around twenty seats, 23 for each of the two parties, Yashar (“Straight Ahead,” of Gadi Eisenkot) and Likud (“Union,” of Benjamin Netanyahu). Their respective parliamentary blocs are also projected to win extremely close scores, with around 50 seats each, ranging from 52 to 60 depending on the scenario.

The Netanyahu Coalition

Netanyahu could potentially win a total of 52 to 58 seats. This would involve forming a coalition with Shas, the Sephardic ultra-Orthodox party, and Otzma Yehudit (“Jewish Power,” led by Itamar Ben-Gvir), each estimated to hold seven seats. It would also involve forming a coalition with HaTzionut HaDatit (“Religious Zionism,” led by Bezalel Smotrich) and Yahadut HaTorah, the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox party, estimated to hold six and eight seats respectively. The 23 seats held by Likud could also be supplemented by the four seats of Amkha Yisrael (“Your People, Israel,” led by Ofer Winter).

Amkha Yisrael, a right-wing nationalist and security-focused party, has refused to merge with Netanyahu’s party but might consider joining the coalition. Netanyahu’s main challenge would be convincing Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and the other right-wing parties to merge in order to surpass the 3.25% electoral threshold. Below this threshold, the lists would be excluded from the seat allocation and their votes would be lost to Netanyahu’s bloc.

Gadi Eisenkot should also be able to secure a comparable number of seats within his bloc. Yashar’s 23 seats would then be joined by BeYahad’s 13 seats (“Together,” the alliance of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid), Yair Golan’s Democrats’ 8 seats, Avigdor Liberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu’s 7 seats, and potentially the Yoaz Hendel-Yaron Zelekha alliance’s 4 seats.

To reach the necessary 61 votes, Eisenkot would face the dilemma of including the dozen seats allocated to Arab parties, including Ra’am (“Reshima Aravit Me’uhedet,” Mansour Abbas) and other Arab groups. The Hendel-Zelekha alliance plans to join only a coalition without Arab or ultra-Orthodox parties.

While Eisenkot needs Arab votes, Netanyahu could hardly do without his alliances with the ultra-Orthodox parties. Everything will therefore hinge on their ability to muster the necessary forces to reach the 61 crucial seats. Eisenkot’s advantage remains his ability to form an ideologically diverse bloc around a common point of convergence: opposition to Netanyahu. The latter, however, with his 16 years as head of government, appears to be the most skillful and experienced in coalition building.

Thus, even if Netanyahu’s party were to lose seats, the coalition dynamics might mean he doesn’t necessarily lose his position as Prime Minister.

Regarding Hezbollah, it would seem that the outcome of these elections will not necessarily alter Israel’s military strategy. Eisenkot, the former Chief of Staff, will primarily think as a military man and an expert on the northern front, which he knows intimately. Since 2006, he has played a decisive role in shaping the Israeli doctrine applied to Lebanon.

A certain continuity is evident between Yashar and Kadima (“Forward”), the party founded in 2005 by Ariel Sharon with the aim of transcending the left-right divide to establish a Zionist center whose doctrine is focused on national security and military power. In this political tradition of Sharon, there is no inherent contradiction between centrism and the logic of military firmness.

In June 2026, Eisenkot had criticized Netanyahu for submitting to American limitations on Israeli military action against the pro-Iranian militia. He had then emphasized the need to preserve Israeli “freedom of action” in Lebanon, including in the southern suburbs of Beirut, a Hezbollah stronghold. His vision thus remains, in essence, close to Netanyahu’s, which is characterized by a refusal of any return to the pre-2023 status quo, whether in Gaza or with regard to Iran’s various proxies. In Israel, the perception of an existential threat transcends all political divisions.

The major nuance to consider is Eisenkot’s tendency to prioritize negotiations, the search for alternatives with the Arabs and the Americans, and a focus on the immediate danger. Eisenkot’s election would therefore risk prolonging Lebanon’s agony, slowing the Levant peace process and the resolution of the Iranian issue. On the other hand, the potential participation of the right-wing parties of Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and Winter in Netanyahu’s bloc would make his policies more radical and determined in his war to eradicate Hezbollah.

Alongside these two scenarios, a third scenario is highly likely to unfold on 27 October. If neither bloc manages to secure the 61 seats required for an absolute majority, the Knesset would find itself in a political deadlock. It would then take several weeks, or even longer, to form a cabinet, while Netanyahu would remain in office as the outgoing Prime Minister.

This lack of a stable political government, combined with a fully operational army, could paradoxically increase the risk of conflagration in Lebanon.

An interim government might be tempted to escalate. It would be able to make security decisions without needing a renewed political mandate. The war in Lebanon, which is still ongoing, is already largely decoupled from the electoral calendar. It will necessarily continue, but at varying paces depending on the outcome of the vote.

This article was originally published in French by Ici Beyrouth on 15 September 2026. The original can be found here.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.