Sheikh al-Hijri is Coming to Lebanon

07/06/2026

By Joseph Sopholaus | Free thinker, poet, and an essayist

Political consciousness among peoples and communities is dynamic; it changes through its interaction with social transformations, philosophical ideas, and political events that continuously reshape its relationship with the world — shaping it as much as they are shaped by it. Violence (whether in the form of ethnic cleansing, sectarian massacres, racial/sectarian discrimination) is perhaps the strongest driver of this dynamism, and Druze political consciousness is no exception.

Within this context emerges the Jumblattist model, which has dominated Druze political consciousness in Lebanon for more than half a century. Its foundations consist of:

• a political family monopolizing the community’s political representation through its patriarch — the “ethnarch,” or leader of the sect/ethnic group;
• a religious institution lacking political independence, whose role remains confined within the framework imposed by the political leadership (the Eastern authoritarian model, exemplified by Arab monarchies and autocratic regimes, as well as contemporary Russian and the subordination of the Russian Orthodox Church to Putinist rule); and
• an assimilationist approach to both self and community, accompanied by a romanticized vision of the political entity as a broader and freer space for self-realization (the unificationist thought rooted in the German Romantic school, which later provided the theoretical foundation for both European fascisms and Arab nationalist movements).

The Jumblattist model also became influential for the Druze community in Syria. And although Syrian Druze politics never fully replicated all its features, it nonetheless adopted its assimilationist outlook. This approach was reinforced by the political privileges (“spoils of war”) that Lebanon’s Druze gained following the Christians’ defeat in the Lebanese Civil War and the subsequent consolidation of Assad regime’s authority in Lebanon.

Yet this model ultimately failed to withstand the sectarian massacres in Suwayda, which shattered the utopian aspirations of the integrationist Druze elite in Syria and compelled them, under the weight of sectarian violence, to reassess many of their political assumptions. This shift became especially pronounced when the centralized state proved incapable to protect its citizens — and indeed after it became an actor in the conflict itself.

National projects lose their value when the very definition of “nationalism” is reduced to identity-based criteria — whether sectarian, ethnic, or linguistic. Those who fall outside these criteria are readily branded as “takfiris,” “regime remnants,” or “Israelis”; in other words, they are transformed into the “Other” or simply the enemy.

In contrast to the “Eastern” Jumblattist model, a “Western” Druze model has emerged — one developed by the Druze of Israel and increasingly embraced by growing segments of Syria’s Druze community. Its foundations rest on pluralistic political institutions, an independent religious institution, and a liberal outlook that has largely abandoned the medieval practice of taqiyya (identity concealment), which modern media have rendered increasingly impractical. Instead, it promotes a consciousness that embraces cultural and sectarian distinctiveness rather than treating it as an obstacle to be suppressed or erased.

Against the backdrop of this transformation, one can better understand Walid Jumblatt’s efforts to contain the Christian federalist movement — from Taymour Jumblatt’s meeting with Fares Saeed and other reactionary figures, to the resurgence of Maronophobic rhetoric directed against Christians, particularly against the Lebanese Forces and its leader Samir Geagea, as well as the invocation of the Mountain War crimes as a memory of victory (most notably during the celebrations marking the “liberation” of Western al-Shahhar). Jumblatt realizes that the “Western” Druze model threatens the future of his political legacy, which remains organically tied to the “Eastern” model that he and his father built through political violence.

For this reason, Jumblatt fears the success of self-rule in Suwayda, because its success would inevitably signal the collapse of the ethnarchic model — the sectarian strongman — and the transition from the logic of the leader as the community’s sole protector to that of a community capable of generating its own mechanisms of protection. In other words, it would mark the triumph of the institution, with all its democratic implications that entails, including the potential to restore economic dynamism and demographic vitality to the Druze people.

In this sense, Sheikh al-Hijri is coming to Lebanon — that is, through what he represents: a new emancipatory consciousness. It is within this framework that one can understand the transformation currently unfolding in Druze political thought, particularly now that the age of grand narratives has come to an end and the overly optimistic promises of total integration have dissolved into illusion. What remains for communities living in pluralistic states is the necessity of rebuilding their relationships on the basis of mutual recognition — foremost among them the recognition of their right to self-government within an expanded federal system.

Jospeh Sopholaus is free thinker, poet, essayist, Levantine Greek Nationalist. and a Classical tradition fan. He is specialized in Arabic linguistics & analytic philosophy. You can follow him @Josephsopholaos.

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 3 June 2026. The original can be found here.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.