The Framework Agreement: The Lesson Lies in Implementation

29/06/2026

By Hicham Bou Nassif | Weinberg Associate Professor of International Relations and the Middle East and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College-California

The first provision of the framework agreement signed by Lebanese and Israeli diplomats in Washington states, “Israel and Lebanon affirm the right of each state to exist in peace.” Few words, yet they represent a revolution in our political reality — not because they affirm Israel’s recognition of Lebanon’s right to exist and live in peace, something Israel has never denied, but because Lebanon has now reciprocated that recognition. Since Lebanon came into existence, it has been caught between one state that did not recognize it — Syria — and another state that Lebanon itself did not recognize — Israel.

Has the first part of this equation changed? Perhaps. At least for now, the positions of the new Syrian government toward Lebanon appear acceptable. With the framework agreement, the second part also changes, namely Lebanon’s refusal to recognize Israel and our country’s explicit declaration of readiness to live peacefully with its southern neighbor.

Practically speaking, all the remaining provisions of the agreement are an operational translation of the fundamental principle of the right to exist in peace. They are also all self-evidently in Lebanon’s interest, especially the second provision affirming the restoration of Lebanese state authority, through its armed forces, over all its territory; Israel’s declaration in the fifth provision that it “has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon;” and Lebanon’s rejection, in the sixth provision, of “claims by any state or non-state actor to use force on its behalf without its explicit authorization.”

There is not enough space here to explain everything positive in the agreement text. It is not an exaggeration to call it a second declaration of independence for Lebanon, following the earlier independence achieved with the departure of Syrian occupation forces in 2005. Ambassador Simon Karam, Ambassador Nada Hamadeh Moawad, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio deserve the gratitude and appreciation of the Lebanese people.

Walid Jumblatt’s negative reaction to the agreement is consistent with his long history of hostility toward Lebanon and efforts to undermine it — first alongside Yasser Arafat, then Hafez al-Assad, and now through alignment with forces such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Nabih Berri, and Hezbollah in their attempts to obstruct or reject the agreement.

These are the same forces that, alongside the Syrian regime, suffocated Lebanon when the 17 May Agreement once promised to free the country from Hafez al-Assad’s grip and permanently end the nightmare of war with Israel. For Jumblatt to see nothing in what happened except the disappearance of the armistice agreement, and for Berri to call him to congratulate him, merely confirms what has long been evident — Jumblatt’s brief alignment with the 14 March movement was temporary, a tactical leap from the Assad family’s sinking ship in Lebanon. His deeper inclinations and natural place remain alongside Syrian nationalists, Khomeinists, and Nabih Berri, against Lebanon.

More generally, however, this is not the main issue. The real challenge is moving the framework agreement from theory to practice — that is, implementing it. Yes, the agreement’s text is excellent. But so too were UN Resolutions 1559 and 1701. Yet both remained largely ink on paper when it came to restricting weapons to the Lebanese state, because the state failed to deal with Hezbollah in the only way it understands and deserves: force.

If the same scenario repeats today, the same result will follow. Will the Lebanese government order the Lebanese Armed Forces to confront the militia on the ground? And if it does, what will Rodolphe Haykal do? That is today’s question. The French thinker Raymond Aron explained the state as the intersection between the diplomat and the soldier. Evidently, the Lebanese diplomat has served his country as best they could. But what about the soldier?

The second concern goes beyond the Lebanese government’s traditional weakness. Iran’s patience in seeking influence over Lebanon is long-term. The opposite, however, is known to be true for the United States. Here too, memories of the 1980s arise. In 1983, Syrian Foreign Minister — and later Vice President — Abdel Halim Khaddam mocked the United States before American diplomats, saying that in Lebanon it had “run out of breath quickly.”

Today, it is also known that Donald Trump quickly grows weary of complex issues. It is certain that the Iran–Hezbollah–Amal axis will attempt to obstruct any solution. Will the United States once again turn its back on Lebanon, as it did when the Marines withdrew in 1984?

This article was originally published in Arabic by Nida al-Watana on 29 June 2026. The original can be found here.

The views expressed in this op-ed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of SyriacPress.